

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

The Mind in early Buddhism: The introduction of the term Citta, pre-Buddhist Citta, chronology in the Buddhist Canon

By Thich Minh Thanh, Ph.D.

“*Philosophy of mind offers a theory of attribution to the mind, Buddhist philosophy of mind explains perceptions on mental phenomena. A rational, biochemical and spiritual exploration of Buddhist philosophy, the study contains spirituality and practical experience in this scholarly paper. It gives awareness so that you can bring yourself to your own right view.*

- Thich Giac Chinh, Chief Editor.

A. THE TERM *CITTA*

PALI-ENGLISH DICTIONARY gives the following 3 basic meanings to the term '*citta*': The first *citta* (v): to shine, to be bright, variegated, manifold, beautiful; tasty, sweet, spiced (of cakes); (nt) painting. The second *citta* (nt) [Skt: *citta*, orig. p.p. of *cintetī*]: 'heart'. 'Mind', however, gets pretty much frequency in actual use as rendering.

And, the third *citta* (n): name of the first month Chaitra. In the whole dissertation, both the first and the second *cittas* will be intact; we shall work on the remaining second *citta* only.

Though it is not totally safe in respect of preciseness in all contexts where the term '*citta*' occurs throughout the *Pāli* literature, the term is usually rendered as 'mind' by the majority of the authoritative translators of *Pāli*. 'Heart' is less used as rendering. But if we consents that *citta* in singular form should be rendered as 'heart' and when in plural, as 'thought' which is closed to mind in meaning, then in the *Pāli* literature *citta* nearly always occurs in the singular (=heart), and out of 150 cases in the *Nikāyas* only 3 times in the plural (=thought). This primary notion is impressive of the fact that the concept of *citta* seems quite complicated and confusing that a rigidly distinctive attitude will find it frustrate.

For our basic knowledge there should be a view to the dictionary meanings of 'mind' [\[1\]](#). 'Mind' has 14 meanings that fall under the three headings: (A) Memory; (B) Thought, purpose, intention; and, (C) Mental or psychic faculty. Skipping over the first heading

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

that is simply confined within the realm of memory we come to the second one. This one is the richest and covers 6 groups of meanings: (1a) The action or state of thinking about something; the thought chiefly in have mind of, think of, give heed to. (1b) Attention, heed. (2a) Purpose, intention. (2b) An inclination, a wish; a liking. (3) The direction of a person's thoughts, desires, inclinations, or energies. (4) A person's opinion, judgement, or view. (5a) A disposition, character, or way of thinking and feeling. (5b) A particular feeling or attitude towards something. (6) The state of a person's thoughts and feelings.

The third heading (C) concerns the psychological aspect covering the following three groups of meaning: (1a) The seat of awareness, thought, volition, and feeling; cognitive and emotional phenomena and powers as constructing a controlling system, special as opposed to matter, the spiritual as distinguished from the bodily part of a human being. (1b) A person or a group of people collectively as the embodiment of mental faculties. (1c) A controlling or directing spiritual being or agency; (2) Special the intellect, intellectual powers, esp. as distinguished from the will and emotions. (3) The healthy or normal condition of the mental faculties.

The ideas about the mind as above mentioned, although quite general, are still helpful somehow in the first inquiry. At the risk of jumping the gun

we can say that the 5.a 'disposition, character, or way of thinking and feeling' has much to do with the Buddhist concept of *citta* under question, whereas, the 1.a. 'the seat of awareness, thought, volition, and feeling' is the most controversial and subtle issue, say, in Buddhist system. Whether there is something as a seat (a place in which administrative power or the like is centered) that sways over the mental and emotional function of a being brings in much more speculation than settlement because of the fact that any ordinary reasoning whatever is prone to build up a soul or an ego which is so metaphysical and speculative in character.

1. The Evolutionary Citta

We should be aware that *citta* in the Buddhist *Pāli* texts is used not thoroughly in the same set of meanings. It shares the same process of almost all lexicon units, say, getting the primitive meaning from the pre-Buddhist conception, adopting new shade of meanings in the traditional Buddhist contexts, undergoing modification, transformation and transmutation, developing current shades of meaning. The process was going parallel with the evolutionary divergence of Buddhist thoughts through ages and characterized by the conceptions of different schools of Buddhist philosophy among them the most noticeable ones are *Theravāda*, *Sarvāstivāda*,

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

Sautrāntika, *Yogācāra*, *Mādhyamika*, and *Tantrism*. In other words, 'the term is common to all schools of Buddhism and is attested in a wide variety of meanings varying according to textual contexts and respective philosophic tradition'[\[2\]](#). But our research work is done on the basis of the *Pāli Tipiṭaka* only, avoiding any sectarian bias and alien conglomeration.

2. Synonymous Equivalent of Citta

It should be noted here that *citta* (verb: *cit*) and *cetas* (verb: *cet*) are almost identical in meaning and application. In promiscuous application there is no cogent evidence of a clear separation of their respective fields of meaning; a few instances indicate the role of *cetas* as seat of *citta*, whereas most of them show no distinction. There are compounds having both *citta*- and *ceto*- in identical meanings, for example, *citta-samādhi* and *ceto-samādhi*. Other compounds show a preference for either one or the other, as *ceto* is preferred in *ceto-khila* and *ceto-vimutti* (but *vimutta-citta*), whereas *citta* is restricted to combination with *upakkilesa*, etc. Let us single out some sentences for illustration: *Vivaṭṭa cetsā sappabhāsaṃ cittaṃ bhāveti* 'with open heart he contemplates a radiant thought'[\[3\]](#); *cetasā cittaṃ samannesati vippamuttaṃ* 'with his heart he scrutinizes their pure mind'[\[4\]](#). *Cetaso*

tato cittaṃ nivāraye 'a desire of his heart he shall exclude from this'[\[5\]](#).

It is interesting to note here that the dual mental projection as in other systems also appears clearly in Buddhism. The notion of one's self and another self dramatizing, so to speak, among the flow of individual subjective experience. We shall come back to this matter in the fifth chapter about essential aspects of *citta*. And this projection is at times expressed by *citta* and the closely allied term *ceto*, as if we should speak of mind affecting will, or 'heart' influencing 'head': Ye should restrain, curb, subdue, *citta* by *ceto*[\[6\]](#). Another passage in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* says that we roam in all directions with *ceto*; here *ceto* is used instead of *citta*[\[7\]](#). The passage probably refers to our ability to dream about and think of distant places and events.

As occurring in the *Sutta Piṭaka* the three terms, *citta*, *viññāṇa* and *mana* are usually interchangeable; all denote function of mentation. Despite of their interchangeability and same denotation we still, however, can notice with a little arbitrariness that they tend toward three distinct aspects of its, say, subjective, sensory and perceptive, and intellectual aspects.

That *mana* is said to represent the rational faculty of man'[\[8\]](#), thus being designated to the intellectuality

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

confronts the disagreement by the *Dhammapada*^[9] where it also denotes the idea of subjective chiefship and directing. *Viññāṇa* with a more clear-cut connotation 'represents the field of sense and sense-reaction, that is the sphere of sensory and perceptive activity'^[10]. *Citta* is supposed to keep as general as ever, though, this does not exclude its tending toward subjectivity.

3. Semantical and Functional Aspects of Citta

PALI-ENGLISH DICTIONARY makes the conviction that the meaning of *citta* is best understood when explaining it by expressions familiar to us, as: *with all my heart; heart and soul; I have no heart to do it; blessed are the pure in heart; singleness of heart*; all of which emphasize the emotional and conative side or 'thought' more than its mental and rational side. With the minute explanatory notes being omitted the meaning of *citta* as given in PALI-ENGLISH DICTIONARY can be presented as the heart usually in psychological sense, and further explained as the center and focus of man's emotional nature as well as that intellectual element which inheres in and accompanies its manifestations^[11]. Emotional, conative, and rational or mental as the three sides in the meaning of *citta* is further elaborated in detail and with illustrations by ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM^[12].

The term *citta* as our main concern should basically refer, on account of its general usage in the *Pāli Nikāyas*, to the nexus of one's emotional nature and, in its dynamic aspect, to the locus or the function of thought.

That "*Citta* represents the subjective aspect of consciousness"^[13] will be correct in many a case, however, does not assure itself in all contexts. The first verse of the *Dhammapada* that reads, "Mind (*mana*) is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox."^[14] has obviously disagreed on it, assigning the subjectiveness not to *citta* but to *mana*.

Buddhaghosa the later commentator of *Pāli* literature establishes four meanings for *citta*: (1) it is *citta* that thinks of its objects on account that it arranges itself in a series by way of apperception in a thought process; (2) *citta*, on the other hand, refers to the resultant thoughts which are accumulated by its intentional actions, wholesome and/or unwholesome, that is, it reaps what it sows; in this meaning it is regarded as the store-house holding mental seeds in the forms of mental dispositions, proclivities, tendencies, and latent forces; (3) *citta* denotes all mental activities, so all classes of thoughts are called *citta* and arrange themselves according to the context of

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

mentation; and (4) the meaning of *citta* can be conceived also by virtue of its capacity to create a variety of effects[15]. Unfortunately, he did not give any clue for the simple flux in his account of *citta*. If any, hardly is 'it arranges itself in a series by way of apperception in a thought process' suggestive of the flux.

In terms of Buddhist psychoanalysis the three different aspects of activities that *citta* performs are effective aspect (*vedanā*), cognitive aspect (*saññā*) (of or pertaining to the mental processes of perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning, as contrasted with emotional and volitional processes) and conative aspect (*cetanā*) (mental actions having to do with striving, including desire, volition, and purpose). The effective aspect and the cognitive aspect are mental states dependent on *citta*[16]. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM says that the *cetanā* clearly is the causative form of *citta* (*cinteti* > *ceteti*, *cetayati* > *cetanā*) and that the effective aspect (*vedanā*) refers to the feeling tone of *citta*; the cognitive aspect (*saññā*) is concerned with knowing, believing, reasoning and perceiving; and the conative aspect (*cetanā*) is concerned with acting, willing, striving, and desiring. These three aspects do not of course function separately. As mental processes all three aspects operate all at once by way of concurrent action and

inter-action. Cognition is associated with conation that in turn is bound up invariably with the hedonic quality of feeling[17].

4. Odd Idea about Citta

It is interesting to notice the alien idea about *citta* that happened to be in the proposition: '*citta* is incorporeal and resident in the cave of the heart'[18]. It is probably because of a reference to this verse, in respect of the physical basis of *citta*, that some section of the *Theravādins* developed a cardio-centric theory according to which the heart (*hadayavatthu*) is the locus of mind and mental consciousness. These *Theravādins* appear to be alone in holding this theory and this is confirmed by the statement of *Yaśomitra*[19] that it is confined only to the school of *Sri Lankan* Buddhism. It is hard to find in the orthodox system of Buddhist thought any place to which the idea can be incorporated properly.

5. Reliable Base for our Definitive Understanding

The traditional Buddhism denies any kinds of substantial definition of *citta* to the extreme. 'Buddha,' ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM says, 'is the first psychologist to 'psychologise' without a soul and the teaching on *citta* is squarely based on the doctrine of the non-substantiality of all phenomena'[20]. The encyclopedia warns anyone who

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

insists on the clear-cut definition of *citta* that 'the complexity of its usage has sometimes defied all attempts of modern scholarship at determining the specificity of its signification'[21]. The Buddha seems to adopt a functional view of concepts, utilizing the term *saṅkhā* to refer to concepts; and the functional use is often expressed by the verbal expression: *saṅkham gacchati* or 'conceive'. The following passage is typical: "*Citta*, just as from cow comes milk, and from milk curds, and from curd butter, and from butter ghee, and from ghee to junket; yet, when there is milk, there is no conceiving as 'curd' or 'butter' or 'ghee' or 'junket'; instead on that occasion there is conceiving as 'milk'" [22].

It can be further noted that *citta* may be rendered by *intention, impulse, design; mood, disposition, state of mind, reaction to impressions*. *Citta*, however, sometimes stands merely for an idea or a thought, for example, a person who was born professional soldier must previously have had the following thought or idea in the common sense: 'Let those beings be tortured, bound, destroyed, exterminated' [23]. The *citta* can be quitted up as is expressed in the passage, 'incompetent, *Sunakkhatta*, is the naked ascetic, *Patika*'s son, to meet me face to face, if he withdraw not those words, if he put not away that idea (*citta*), if he renounce not that opinion. If he thinks

that, holding to those words, to that idea, maintaining that opinion, he would come to meet the *Samaṇa Gotama*, his head would split asunder'[24]. *Citta* here means merely an idea.

6. The Preferred Functionalism

It is suggestible that *citta* can be analyzed as to its nature in the disciplines of psychology, ethics and naturalism [25]. But for the sake of being in concord with the Buddhist theory of suffering and of non-substance - the former mainly relating to the basic for ethical attitude and the latter, for philosophical viewpoint - the disciplines of ethics and of psychology are preferable. The functionalistic approach in the discipline of modern psychology, it is at the risk going a little astray to note, comes to overshadow the once-dominating structuralism, emphasizing "the study of mind from the 'is for' point of view rather than from the 'is' point of view" [26].

The *Abhidhamma* texts reveal the comprehensive system of the universe as consists in four great divisions: *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa* and *nibbāna*. *Citta* holds the top position and can be predicated in three ways, namely, 'predication by agency (*kattu-sādhana*), predication by instrumentality (*kaṇa-sādhana*) and predication by simple flux' (*bhāva-sādhana*); the last one is considered to be nearest to the truth. It is in keeping with the essence of Buddhist non-

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

substance theory to say, 'yielding true knowledge is the predication by simple flux'[\[27\]](#).

Citta is overwhelmingly characterized by combination so that its manifestation should be worded in terms of relationship. If we chanced upon the definition of any wholesome or unwholesome *citta* in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* or the *Vibhaṅga*, we would be aware that to define any *citta* is but to touch all mental functions, mental agents of an individual. For the sake of illustration we quote, though it is at risk of being clumsy, here the whole definition of the first of the eight main types of *citta* relating to the Sensuous Universe: "When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe has arisen, which is accompanied by happiness and associated with knowledge, and has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a (mental) state, or what not, then there is contact, feeling, perception, thinking, thought, conception, discursive thought, joy, easy, self-collectedness, the faculty of faith, the faculty of energy, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of wisdom, the faculty of ideation, the faculty of happiness, the faculty of vitality; right views, right intention, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right concentration; the power of faith, the power of energy, the power of mindfulness, the power of

concentration, the power of wisdom, the power of conscientiousness, the power of the fear of blame; absence of lust, absence of hate, absence of dullness, absence of covetousness, absence of malice, right views; conscientiousness, fear of blame; serenity in the sense and thought, lightness in sense and thought, plasticity in sense and thought, facility in sense and thought, fitness in sense and thought, directness in sense and thought; mindfulness, intelligence, quiet, insight, grasp, balance. Now, these -- or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion -- these are states that are good"[\[28\]](#)

All the functions and the so-called agents are but transect and ever-changing like a stream of water[\[29\]](#).

7. Nature of Citta

The nature of *citta* is difficult to be seen and understood and it is very subtle[\[30\]](#), very hard to control, assuredly light and quick and attaching itself to whatever it craves[\[31\]](#). It is, in case of the worldling, constantly frightened, terrified and alarmed as well as agitated, flurried and anxious[\[32\]](#). The nature of *citta* should also be counted on account of its dependent origination in which the causal factors play the decisive role in the arising of mind, thus subjecting to the impermanence earmark of *saṅkhāra*. Even in the Buddha's time *Bhikkhu Sāti* was ignored of the fact that there is

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

no arising of the mind (in this case the term *Viññāṇa* is employed) unless it is through the collocation of causal factors[33].

The nature of *citta* is multifaceted, this suggests the title of the fourth chapter, and the expositions situationally given by the Buddha about its nature are hardly molded into any formal definition of *citta*. Even the Buddha felt difficult in describing a single aspect of its nature, saying, "I consider, monks, that there is no phenomenon that comes and goes so quickly as mind. It is not easy to find simile to show how quickly mind comes and goes"[34].

Citta in the Buddhist view, is thus a series of events in an incessant process of mentation. *Citta* as unitary term is nothing more than a convenient collective noun to comprehend a wide and complex nexus of mental states in flux as ever mentioned in the forgoing section. As to its nature the *citta* or mind of the worldly individual is, psychologically speaking, constantly throbbing, trembling and wavering[35]. Ethically, it is exceedingly difficult to be protected and to be saved from falling into moral lapse. Naturalistically, it quivers like a fish out of water distracted by a multiplicity of stimuli[36].

Now, the main course of treatment should be postponed to make a brief introduction of the pre-Buddhist concept of *citta*. And then, it is followed

by a survey of the primary source on the basis of which the study is elaborated. This survey tents towards chronological perspective.

B. PRE-BUDDHIST *CITTA*

1. *Citta* of General Meanings

Among the most important verbal roots denoting mental processes in the *Rg Veda*, N. Ross Reat observes, \sqrt{cit} is the most general in meaning that it well-nigh refers to the functioning of any mental organs and faculties. The most common nouns derived from this verbal root, namely, *citta*, *citti* and *cetas*, are for all intents and purposes synonymous, and refer very generally to "thought" or in some cases "mind". Nouns and verbs derived from the root \sqrt{cit} are so broad in meaning as to be capable of being substituted for virtually any of the more precise terms for mental organs and faculties. The verbal root \sqrt{man} and its derivatives - the closest relatives of \sqrt{cit} - are almost as broad in meaning as the derivatives of \sqrt{cit} . Generally speaking, they imply more specifically than \sqrt{cit} the process of intellectual cogitation. Other than this very vague and inconsistent distinction, the derivatives of \sqrt{cit} and \sqrt{man} , in the *Rg Veda*, are practically indistinguishable in meaning. Verbal forms of \sqrt{cit} , however, are more common than nominal forms while the opposite is true of derivatives of \sqrt{man} . It is probably best therefore to translate

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

nominal forms of \sqrt{cit} with "thought", and the term *manas* with "mind". Such translation construe *manas* as mental organ and *citta* as mental faculties, even though admittedly there is no clear distinction between these terms in actual usage in the *R̥g Veda* [37].

The derivatives of \sqrt{cit} in *R̥g Veda*, like the term *citta* in Buddhism, refer in the broadest way to mental process whether perceptive, intellectual, emotional or imaginative [38]. It may be said that these derivatives denote the functioning of any one of the several mental organs and faculties mentioned in the *R̥g Veda*. Used with the term *manas*, \sqrt{cit} indicates mental perception or intellectual thought. With *hṛd* (heart) it refers to emotional or intuitive thought. With $\sqrt{dhī}$ it refers to imaginative, visionary thought. With *kratu* it refers to volitional thought. It is the broad and general nature of \sqrt{cit} and its derivatives that constitutes the most distinctive characteristic of this family of terms [39].

It should be noted that most of the psychologically significant derivatives of \sqrt{cit} occur in relatively late texts, the majority being in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* [40].

2. Citta and Mana

The two terms are so close in interrelation that most of the cases especially in the early *Vedic* texts they

are interchangeable without any risk of unintentional modification of the meaning. In the *Vedas*, the idioms referring to mind are nearly always *manas*; they are much like our own analogous phrases such as: "Sun travels quick as mind"... "we know what thy mind was"... "approving thy mind"... "this praise has been offered by the mind"... "what a man reaches with mind, that he expresses by speech"... "by what great mind may we arrest the storm gods?"... "wise in mind... trembling in mind... please in mind"... "a woman mindful of the gods"... "we must consult the thought (*citta*) of another... beyond our thoughts (*cittāni*)"... "which prayer is to be the choice of thy mind?" [41]. A comparison of the frequency of the main psychological terms used in the 13 'principal', i.e. Early and Middle *Upaniṣads* results in the following table [42].

Table 1:

<i>Manas:</i>	173	references
<i>Citta:</i>	18	references
<i>Vijñāna:</i>	29	references
<i>Buddhi:</i>	12	references
<i>Cetas:</i>	3	references
<i>Cetana:</i>	3	references

Through the above table we can see the less frequency of the term *citta* in comparison with its posterior term *viññāṇa*. *Citta* was never favored term as was *manas*. In its root we have man's awareness worded as perceiving,

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

observing. The result is as a manifold or motley, *cit*-meaning also this, but the active agency in the process is not so strongly implicit as is the measuring, planing, willing, in *manas*^[43].

For a further distinction between the two terms we can note that in most contexts the terms derived from \sqrt{cit} is associated with *manas* (mind). The *manas* is often depicted as the agent of the process of thought as represented by the derivatives of \sqrt{cit} , as in the phrases such as *manasā cekitānam* (thinking or perceiving with the mind), *mano cetati* (the mind thinks). In other contexts, a derivative of \sqrt{cit} may qualify the mind in an adjective sense, as in the phrase *cikivīn-manas* (thoughtful or perceptive mind)^[44]. The above distinctive cases at most are not enough to refute the predominance of their basic interchangeability as presented in the previous section.

3. Emotional and Intellectual Citta

N. Ross Reat observes that the emotional connotation of \sqrt{cit} is most evident when derivatives based on it are said to be moved by an external force, as when the worship and/or sacrifice stirs the thought (*cetana*). On the other hand, these derivatives are also said to be the stirring or moving force which incites various gods to action, as when *Soma* and *Agni* are said to be moved or stirred into action by the

thought of the sacrificer. Emotional content is also found in passages such as one where Atri is said to "think with a friendly mind"^[45].

Citta seems to have much to do with the basic sensual consciousness, as in the following verse, where the departure of *citta* marks the end of such consciousness: "When a sick person about to die gets to such weakness as to fall into a stupor they say of him, his thought (*citta*) has departed, he does not hear, he does not see, he does not speak with speech, he does not think"^[46]. But in the another aspect, the derivatives of \sqrt{cit} are of intellectuality. The derivatives denote in several compounds some sort of development or excellence of the faculty of thought or perception, as in the terms: *vipaścita* (wise or insightful), *sucetas* (thoughtful), *gambīr-a-cetas* (deep-thoughted), *praceta* (wise). The intellectual connotation is obviously predominant in the phrase "to solve (*āciketam*) a riddle"^[47].

4. Citta of Vision.

It is observed that the derivatives of \sqrt{cit} associated with the potency of seeing, in the broad sense of the word, are in some cases quite literal, as when *Agni* is said to be observant (*cetiṣṭham*) with the eyes (*akṣabhir*), or in a wartime curse in which the wish is expressed that the perception (*citta*) of

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

those foes who stand watch be destroyed. In other contexts, the term *citta* seems to mean simply "visible", as in the phrase *citta-garbha*, which Griffith translates "visibly pregnant". In still other cases, derivatives of \sqrt{cit} refer to mental perception, as when it is said that *Mitra* and *Varuṇa* perceive (*cikyatuḥ*) even with their eyes closed, or where it is said with relation to a riddle that those who have eyes, obviously mental eyes, can see while the blind do not perceive (*na vicetaḥ andhaḥ*), or again where it is asked, "who discerns (*ciketa*) the workings of *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*?". The derivatives of \sqrt{cit} are also used to denote vision, particularly mental vision in the *R̥g Veda*[\[48\]](#).

When purified, *citta* is praised as *prajñā* of the early *Upaniṣads*. In the sixth book of the *Maitri*, we can find both *cetas* and *citta* exalted to mean nothing less than the *prajñā*[\[49\]](#). A purified *citta* is said to be capable of grasping the ultimate truth, however, its purification seems to involve its cessation[\[50\]](#).

5. Metaphysical Citta

The substantialist metaphysic of Indian thought could be expressed by the presumptive statements such as the *Upaniṣadic* passage which reads that in the beginning, this world was only the self (*ātman*) in the form of a person.

Looking around he saw nothing else than the self. He first said 'I am'. There arose then the name of 'I' for the first time. Later on he realized the real self and the mutable self (or the empirical consciousness) which are graphically presented with the image of two birds perched on one branch, the one simply watching and the other enjoying the fruit[\[51\]](#). Through the range of meaning as meant by the root \sqrt{cit} above presented, it is quite safe to suppose that the root \sqrt{cit} 's family would be able to compass either of 'the two birds' and both of them.

The derivatives of \sqrt{cit} seem to be construed either as the essence of the soul and universe or as the fundamental characteristic of both the individual and the universal soul. It is implied in the rhetoric question: "This body is like a cart, without thought; by the power of what super-sensuous being is it made to arise with thought (*cetanavat*); or who is its mover?" or the statement "The enjoyer (*bhoktr*) of this universe is without qualities (*nirguṇa*), but because of its being an enjoyer, it must have thought (*caitanya*)[\[52\]](#). As a super-sensuous being, the thought has the potency of creating. This creativity is not confined to artistic composition, as when it is said that the hymn springs from the thoughtful mind (*cikītvīn-manas*). It may also refer to the idea of spontaneous creation of an entity, as in a hymn stating that the gods created fire

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

with *citti*. There is another context where the *Rbhus* are said to have created a miraculous chariot by means of "excellent thought" (*sucetas*) and mind (*manas*)^[53]. In fine, the *Upaniṣadic* system virtually tends to regard the world as a creation of consciousness, saying that at the dissolution of all, he alone remains awake. Thus from that space, he awakes this world which consists of thought only (*cetāmātra*)^[54].

C. CHRONOLOGY IN THE BUDDHIST CANON

1. Different Tables of Stratification

Exploration into the conclusive outcomes of the stratification of the Buddhist canonical texts proposed by the leading scholars conversant in the *Pāli* literature let us know that the oldest stratification may be that of T. W. Rhys Davids who observes ten strata scheme. Unfortunately, it is not an easy feeling on the side of those who care for scientific exactness to find that both B. C. Law and K. L. Hazra do summarize the same scheme from *Buddhist India* by T. W. Rhys Davids but do not turn out the same summaries. (see appendix 1)

The chronology observed by T. W. Rhys Davids, nevertheless, is not fully agreed on by other scholars. B. C. Law regards it as too catechetical, too cut and dried, and too general to be accepted, though its suggestion is a good guide to the

determination of the chronology of the *Pāli* canonical texts^[55]. We will be in touch with the table time after time when dealing with each individual collection and their component texts.

B. C. Law gives his own scheme of 5 layers, basing on the dates of 6 Buddhist Councils in India and Ceylon respectively^[56]:

Table 2:

First Period:	483 - 383 BC
Second Period:	383 - 265 BC
Third Period:	265 - 230 BC
Fourth Period:	230 - 80 BC
Fifth Period:	80 - 20 BC

On the basis of the above setting, B. C. Law observes, it would be easy to arrange a number of books, for example, *Parivārapāṭha*, the last *Abhidhamma* treatise whose colophon informs us that it was composed in Ceylon by a Buddhist Ceylonese scholar monk, *Dīpa* by name^[57]. One reference of the book makes it known to us that its composition took place after the *Vinaya Piṭaka* being promulgated by *Thera Mahinda*. The succession of his disciples from the time of *Thera Mahinda* given in the text enables us to conclude that its composition could not be possible until the reign of king *Vaṭṭagāmaṇi* because it openly declares in the colophon that the author had the treatise be written down.

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

This manner of preservation of the scriptures would not be conceivable before the time of *Vaṭṭagāmaṇi*[58].

B. C. Law gets a full credit for the introduction of the foregoing 5-stage setting which, unfortunately, is not further elaborated on. And, another contribution is at the end of the chapter where he reserves for the 'Chronology of the *Pāli* Canon' and comes back to the scheme of 10 strata originally sketched out by T. W. Rhys Davids, on which he makes some remarkable comments, modifications and adjustments.

For the sake of comparison we should juxtapose the previous stratification of T. W. Rhys Davids and the later one of B. C. Law as follows,

Table 3:

By T. W. Davids	By B. C. Law
1. The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or	1. The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.
	2. Episodes found, in identical words, in two or more of the existing books.
	3. The <i>Sīlas</i> , the <i>Pārāyaṇa</i> , the <i>Octades</i> , the <i>Pātimokkha</i> .
	4. The <i>Dīgha</i> , <i>Majjhima</i> , <i>Aṅguttara</i> , and <i>Samyutta Nikāyas</i> .
	5. The <i>Sutta Nipāta</i> , the <i>Thera-</i> and <i>Therī-gāthās</i> , the <i>Udānas</i> , and the <i>Khuddhaka Pāṭha</i> .
	6. The <i>Mahāvagga</i> and the <i>Cullavagga</i> , the <i>Pātimokkha</i> code completing 227 rules, the <i>Vimānavatthu</i> and <i>Petavatthu</i> , the <i>Dhammapada</i> and the <i>Kathāvatthu</i> .
	7. The <i>Jātakas</i> and the <i>Dhammapada</i> as.
	8. The <i>Niddesa</i> , the <i>Itivuttakas</i> , and the <i>Paṭisambhidā</i> .
	9. The <i>Cullaniddesa</i> , the <i>Mahāniddesa</i> , the <i>Udāna</i> , the <i>Itivuttaka</i> , the <i>Sutta Nipāta</i> , the <i>Dhātukathā</i> , the <i>Yamaka</i> , and the <i>Paṭṭhāna</i> .
	10. The <i>Buddhavaṃsa</i> , the <i>Cariyāpiṭaka</i> , and the <i>Apadāna</i> .

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

9. The <i>Peta-</i> and <i>Vimāna-vatthus</i> , the <i>Apadānas</i> , the <i>Cariyā Piṭaka</i> , and the <i>Buddha Vamsa</i> .	9. The <i>Parivārapāṭha</i> .
10. The <i>Abhidhamma</i> books; the last of which is the <i>Kathā Vatthu</i> and the earliest probably the <i>Puggalapaññatti</i> .	10. The <i>Khuddakapāṭha</i> .

The juxtaposition of the stratification by T. W. Rhys Davids (abbreviated as A) with the other one by B. C. Law (abbreviated as B) shows that their first two strata are completely identical. The third strata contain each 4 items of which the first three, namely, the *Sīlas*, the *Pārāyaṇa*, the *Octades*, the *Pātimokkha* are nearly identical, the difference is that A gives a sharper boundaries of denotation of the *Pārāyaṇa* and the *Octades*. The last item of this strata in A, i.e. the *Pātimokkha* is substituted by the *Sikkhāpadas* in B. That in the fourth strata the first position is occupied by the *Dīgha Nikāya* is partly agreed upon by the 2 scholars, B. C. Law drags the vol. ii and vol. iii of the *Dīgha Nikāya* which are followed by the *Majjhima Nikāya* down to the heading position of the next stratum,

stratum 5. The *Āṅuttara* and the *Saṃyutta* succeeding the *Majjhima Nikāya* in the fourth strata replace each other in table B. B. C. Law adds to this level the earlier *Pātimokkha* code of 152 rules. In the fifth stratum both A and B are quite different: the first position is occupied as already mentioned by the *Dīgha Nikāya* ii and iii in B and by the *Sutta Nipāta* in A; the *Thera-* and *Therī-gāthās* follow up in both the tables; the *Udānas* and the *Khuddakapāṭha* in A are replaced by the Collection of 500 *Jātakas*, the *Sutta Vibhaṅga*, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, the *Puggalapaññatti* and the *Vibhaṅga* in B. From stratum 6 onward the 2 tables becomes easily seen to be totally different. When discussing each of the individual items we will be in touch with the stratification again.

In his *The Origin and Nature of Indian Buddhism*, K.T.S. Sarao shows a keen interest in the issue of Buddhist chronology, giving an account on this concern with the conclusion of 3 strata scheme tabulated as follows^[59]:

Table 4:

I	II	III
Substantially Pre-Mauryan Texts	Substantially Mauryan Texts	Substantially Post-Mauryan Texts

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

<i>Vinaya Piṭaka</i> (Except CV-xi, xii, <i>Sekhiya</i> Rules and <i>Parivārapāṭha</i>)	<i>Cullavagga</i> xi-xii and <i>Sekhiya</i> rules of the <i>Vinaya Piṭaka</i>	<i>Parivārapāṭha</i>
<i>Dīgha Nikāya</i>		
<i>Majjhima Nikāya</i>		
<i>Saṃyutta Nikāya</i>		
<i>Aṅguttara Nikāya</i>		
<i>Udāna</i> (verse only)	<i>Udāna</i> (prose only)	
	<i>Theragāthā</i>	
	<i>Therīgāthā</i>	
	<i>Jātaka</i> verse (with few exceptions)	<i>Jātaka</i> (prose portion)
		<i>Apadāna</i>
		<i>Buddhavaṃsa</i>
		<i>Cariyapīṭaka</i>

K. T. S. Sarao thoughtfully warns readers that the above classification should not be regarded as being water-tight because almost all the texts were strongly possible to be composed from the material stocks in different periods of time, and in such a literature as the Buddhist canon no unit can be invented safely.

2. Chronology of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*

The *Vinaya Piṭaka* known commonly as "Basket of Discipline" is the oldest and smallest of the three sections of the Buddhist canonical *Tipiṭaka* or "Triple Basket". It is that which regulates monastic life and the daily affairs of monks and nuns according to rules attributed to the Buddha. It varies less from school to school than does either the *Sutta* (discourse of the Buddha and his disciples) or the *Abhidhamma* (scholastic) sections of the canon, and the rules themselves are basically the same even for *Mahāyāna* schools, although some of the latter schools greatly extended the accompanying narrative and commentarial material.

It is remarked that while the *Sutta Piṭaka* is more doctrinally and cosmologically oriented, the focus of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* is upon proper courses of action conducive to making progress towards the final spiritual attainment of *nirvāṇa*. Although it is evident in early Indian Buddhism that categorical distinctions were made between groups of *bhikṣus* (referred to as *bhāṇakas*) who had committed all or parts of these three collections to memory for the purpose of preserving them through recitation, each "basket" stands in complementary relationship to the other and the whole represents an integrated system of religious teaching. Some scholars and Buddhist apologists have understood the *Vinaya* to be the

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

first stage of the spiritual path, and extended code of behavioral discipline elaborates from the basic principles of *sīla* (moral ethical action)[\[60\]](#).

The *Vinaya Piṭaka* texts show a certain resemblance with the *Vedic Brāhmaṇas*. In both we find "rule" (*vidhī*) and "explanation of the meaning" (*arthavāda*) by the side of one another, and the narrative poems which stand out distinctly like oases in the desert of the religious technics[\[61\]](#).

The term *vinaya* means putting away, subduing, conversion, training, and discipline. R. C. Childers says that *Vinaya* is regarded as the ecclesiastical code or common law and it governs the Buddhist monks and it is mentioned in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. He states further that *saṃvarav* and *pahānav* are two sorts of *Vinaya* or discipline and they are discipline of restraint and discipline of getting rid of evil states. He again describes *Vinaya* as "removal (of blame), acquittal"[\[62\]](#). Specially, *Vinaya* refers to the prescribed modes of conduct incumbent upon Buddhist monks and nuns. The word is formed by combining the prefix *vi-*, meaning "difference, distinction, apart, away from", with the verb root \sqrt{ni} , meaning to lead. When combined they mean "to lead away from".

Within the context of Buddhist monasticism, *Vinaya* refers to the code

of behavioral discipline that at once delineates the life of the householder and that of the monk, and binds the community of monks together into a common affective bond. In this sense, *Vinaya* is that which separates or leads away from the householder's way of life. It can also refer to the practice of mental discipline that removes unhealthy states of mind from the monk's disposition. In either sense of the term, *Vinaya* is regarded as the effective expression or pragmatic implementation of the Buddha's *dharma* (teaching). It is precept put into practice[\[63\]](#).

Historically, it is clear that *Vinaya* has not only been the charter for the Buddhist monastic experience, but has continued to function as a legitimizing device for reform within the *saṅgha* as well. It is important to note that just as the ancient laity play an important role within the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* literature by reporting infractions of discipline to the Buddha, so has the laity in modern times continued to display great interest in insuring that the *saṅgha* adheres to the *Vinaya*. Lay concern for *Vinaya*, however, is not expressed only for the purpose of keeping monks in their proper places, but also out of the necessity of preserving a *saṅgha* that truly function as a spiritual refuge and a worthy object of meritorious action[\[64\]](#).

In the oldest record that we possess of the first council, it is said that

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

Mahākassapa asked Upāli about the two-fold *Vinaya*. This suggests that he asked him only about the *Pātimokkha* rules for *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs*. In his account of that council *Buddhaghosa* states that the *theras* classified the *Mahā Vibhaṅga*, the *Bhikkhūnī Vibhaṅga*, the *Khandhaka* and the *Parivāras*, but he concedes that the *Vinaya Piṭaka* as he knew contained material which had not been recited at the first council. It is obvious, and presumably *Buddhaghosa* realised, that the final two sections of the *Khandhaka*, which deal with the first council and the second council dated 100 years later, could not have been recited on that occasion, but there is no indication of the portions of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* he had in mind when he wrote of texts not being recited [65].

The *Pāli Vinaya Piṭaka* in the latest form is divided into three partitions, the *Sutta Vibhaṅga*, the *Khandhakas*, and the *Parivāra*. The concise account of each of the partitions is below.

1. *Sutta Vibhaṅga*: The word *Sutta* (*sūtra* in *Sanskrit*) is a very ancient literary term in *India*. The literal meaning is "thread", and it is applied to a kind of book, the contents of which are, as it were, a thread, giving the gist or substance of more than is expressed in them in words. This sort of book was the latest development

in *Vedic* literature just before and after the rise of Buddhism. The word was adopted by the Buddhists to mean a discourse, a chapter, a small portion of a sacred book in which for the most part some one point is raised, and more or less disposed of. But the *Sutta* par excellence, is that short statement of all the rules of the Order, which is also called the *Pātimokkha*, and is recited on every *Uposatha* day.

The *Sutta Vibhaṅga* is a detailed analysis concerning the rules recorded in the *Pātimokkha*. It has the same eight sections as the *Pātimokkha*. Regarding each of the rules, the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* has a four-fold structures as already mentioned: 1. A story (or stories) explaining the circumstances under which the rule was pronounced; 2. The *Pātimokkha* rule; 3. A word for word commentary on the rules; and 4. Stories indicating mitigating circumstances in which exceptions to the rule or deviations in punishment might be made. Like the *Pātimokkha* there are both, a *Bhikkhu Sutta Vibhaṅga* (sometimes referred to as *Mahā Vibhaṅga*) and a *Bhikkhūnī Vibhaṅga*. [66]

2. *Khandhakas* give the precepts for the various arrangements of the order and the regulation of the entire conduct of the monks and nuns in their daily life, form a kind of continuation and supplement of the *Sutta Vibhaṅga*. The ten sections of the *Mahā Vagga* contain

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

the special precepts for admission into the order, for the *Upasatha* celebrations, for life during the rainy season, and further, the rules for the wearing of shoes, facilities for seats and vehicles, medicine and clothing of the monks, and finally for the regulation of the legal conditions and the legal procedure within the order, especially in the case of schisms. The first 9 sections of the *Culla Vagga* deal with the disciplinary methods in lesser matters, with various atonements and penances, the settlement of disputes, the daily life of the monks, dwellings and furnishing of dwellings, the duties of monk towards one another and the exclusion from the *Pātimokkha* ceremony. Section 10 of the *Culla Vagga* deals with the duties of the nuns. Sections 11 and 12 that record the stories of the first 2 councils are no doubt later additions, and form a kind of appendix to the *Culla Vagga*.^[67]

3. **Parivāra** is regarded as insignificant and much later product. It is said with little doubt to be merely the work of a *Sinhalese* monk. The last book of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* comprises of 19 small texts, catechisms, Indices, appendices, lists and similar things. They have the form of questions and answers in common with the texts of *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* that originated perhaps at about the same time.^[68]

The *Vinaya Piṭaka* is extant in the following versions: the *Vinaya* of the (1) *Theravādins* in Pāli, portions of

the *Vinaya* of the (2) *Mūlasarvāstivādins* in Sanskrit contained in the Gilgit Manuscripts; and in Tibetan and Chinese translations (in the latter, not in its entirety); the *Vinayas* of the schools of (3) *Sarvāstivādins*, (4) *Dharmaguptas*, (5) *Mahīśāsakas*, and the (6) *Mahāsaṅghikas* in Chinese translation. Besides, fragments are available in Sanskrit that clearly belonged to or were associated with the originals of some of these *Vinayas*. In its Chinese translation^[69], the *Sarvāstivādin Vinaya* is followed by the *Vinayaśūdraka* and the *Uttaragrantha*, which includes an *Upāliparipṛcchā*, a series of questions on *Vinaya* put to the Buddha by Upāli. This would seem to correspond to the Pāli *Upāli-pañcaka*, but a Sanskrit portion of this found in *Turkestan* does not agree with the Pāli *Parivāra*.

One Chinese version of the *Upāliparipṛcchā* is said to be very similar to the Pāli *Parivāra*, although there seem to be abridgements and changes of order in the treatment of the various rules, and there is doubt about the sect to which this text belonged. There also exists in Chinese an *Ekottara* section in the appendices to the shortened version of the *Sarvāstivādin Vinaya* called *Daśādhyāya Vinaya*.

The *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya* also has a section called *Ekottara*, while

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

the *Mūlasarvāstivādins* too had a supplement to their *Vinaya* called *Uttara-grantha*. The fact that other schools found it necessary to have supplements to their *Vinayas* supports the view that some, at least, of the Pāli *Parivāra* was composed in *India* before the introduction of Buddhism to Ceylon[70].

As to the relationship of these *Vinayas*, it is now an established fact that the *Prātimokṣa* is practically the same for all the sects, but the agreement is supposed to extend to the *Vibhaṅga* and even the *Khandaka*. Fragments have been discovered at *Koutcha* which correspond to portions of the *Mahāvagga*; and there is close resemblance that exists in the order of representation between the Pāli and *Mahāsaṅghika Vinayas* where the *Mahāvagga* is concerned. It appeared that the diversity of the *Vinaya* redactions is a later growth based on an originally common stock of rules[71].

While there is no direct evidence to suggest that any of these recensions of the *Vinaya* text were fixed in writing before the first century B.C., their uncanny similarity suggests at once a common origin in a period of time preceding the emergence of Buddhist sectarianism and a fundamental unwillingness on behalf of *Saṅgha* communities to alter the basic charter of monastic Buddhism[72].

In the scheme of stratification which B. C. Law put for the whole *Tipiṭaka*, the *Vinaya Piṭaka* scatters into the 5 strata: (1) the *Sīlas* and the *Sikkhāpadas* in the third stratum, (2) the earlier *Pātimokkha* code of 152 rules in the fourth stratum, (3) the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* in the fifth stratum, (4) the *Mahāvagga* and the *Cullavagga*, the *Pātimokkha* code completing 227 rules in the sixth stratum, and (5) the *Parivāra* or *Parivārapāṭha* in the ninth stratum[73]. In another way of observation, Oldenberg has sketched out the probable course of five stages along which the growth of the *Vinaya* proceeded:

The *Pātimokkha* and part at least of the liturgical formulae imbedded in the *Khandakas* form the earliest stage. The old commentary, wholly philological and exegetical, and containing nothing of a legendary or quasi-historical nature, constitutes the next stage. The traditions of this latter character, together with what we may call notes on the rules, were amalgamated to the text and the old commentary which should be in the third stage. The last two books of the *Cullavagga* are still later, and the *Parivāra* is the latest of all. Thus, from the first rivulet of small and definite nucleus, the *Vinaya* has reached its present form in at least five stages[74].

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

In comparison between the scheme of B. C. Law and that of T. W. Davids, the later is more general one in which the major parts of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, namely, the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* and the *Khandaka*, fall into the sixth stratum. The *Sīla* and the *Pātimokkha* into the third stratum; and, no mention of the *Parivāra* is available in his table^[75].

3. Chronology of the Abhidhamma^[76] Piṭaka

The *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* known as the Basket of Special Doctrine or Further Doctrine, is the third and historically the latest of the three Baskets. Unlike the *Sutta* and *Vinaya*, the seven *Abhidhamma* works are not generally claimed to represent the words of the Buddha himself but of disciples and great scholars. Nevertheless, they are highly venerated, particularly in Burma. These are not systematic philosophical treatises but a detailed scholastic reworking, according to schematic classifications, of doctrinal material appearing in the *Suttas*. As such they represent a development in a rationalistic direction of summaries or numerical lists that had come to be used as a basis for meditation among the more mystically inclined, contributed to the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, the form predominant in East Asia. The topics dealt with in the *Abhidhamma* books include ethics, psychology, and epistemology.

As the last major division of the canon, the *Abhidhamma* corpus has had a checkered history. It was not accepted as canonical by the *Mahāsaṅghika* school, the forerunners of *Mahāyāna*. Another school included within the *Abhidhamma* division most of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, the latest section of the *Sutta Piṭaka*. And various *Mahāyāna* texts have been classified as *Abhidhamma*, including the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* in Tibet and, in China, the *Diamond Sūtra*.

G. C. Pande observes that the *Abhidhamma* and its versions probably grew out of the *Mātikās* and is found in only two schools - *Theravāda* and *Sarvāstivāda*.

The *Dharmaguptas* and the *Kāśyapīyas* are also supposed to have had an *Abhidharma Piṭaka* but they were sub-sects of the *Sarvāstivāda* group.

The *Theravāda*'s *Abhidhamma* consists of seven works: *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhāt ukatthā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Yamaka*, *Paṭṭhāna*. The *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* also consists of seven works: *Jñānaprasthāna* and the six *Pādaśāstras* which are: (1) *Saṅgītiparyāyapāda*, (2) *Dharmaskandha*, (3) *Prajñaptipāda*, (4) *Vijñānakāyapāda*, (5) *Dhātukāyapāda*, and (6) *Prakaraṇapāda*^[77].

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

An examination of the titles of these texts, however, shows that only one, viz. the *Dhātukāya* resembles any of the *Theravādin* texts, and we must either assume that the number seven in each collection is a coincidence, or deduce that the *Sarvāstivādins* were aware of the number of texts in the *Theravādin Abhidhamma Piṭaka* and deliberately refuted their texts and replaced them by new ones after the schism[78].

The seven works of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, although based on the contents of the Buddha's discourses, deal with selected and specific topics which form the basis for the later philosophical interpretations. The following is a brief account on each and every of the seven *Abhidhamma* works in the *Pāli* version:

1. ***Dhammasaṅgaṇi*** (Summary of *Dhamma*): An enumeration of the entities constituting reality. In practice, it is a psychologically oriented manual of ethics for advanced monks but long popular in *Ceylon*.

2. ***Vibhaṅga*** (Division or Classification): A definition of these entities from various points of view, a kind of supplement to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, treating many of the same topics.

3. ***Dhātukathā*** (Discussion of Elements): A classification of the elements of reality according to various

levels of organization, another supplementary work.

4. ***Puggalapaññatti*** (Designation of Person): An interesting psychological typology in which people are classified according to their intellectual acumen and spiritual attainments, largely a collection of excerpts from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* of the *Sutta Piṭaka*, classifying human characteristics in relation to stages on the Buddhist path; generally considered the earliest *Abhidhamma* text.

5. ***Kathāvatthu*** (Points of Controversy): A later work discussing the controversial doctrinal points among the various ancient schools, attributed to *Moggaliputta*, president of the third Buddhist Council, the only work in the *Pāli* canon assigned to a particular author; historically the most important of the seven, the *Kathāvatthu* is a series of questions from a heretical (i.e. non-*Theravāda*) point of view, with their implications refuted in the answers; the long first chapter debates the existence of a soul.

6. ***Yamaka*** (Pairs): Dealing with basic sets of categories arranged in pairs of questions, a series of question on psychological phenomena, each dealt with in two opposite ways.

7. ***Paṭṭhāna*** (Activations or Causes): A complex and voluminous treatment of causality and 23 other kinds of

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

relationships between phenomena, mental or material.

About the chronology of the *Abhidhamma* in all, K. R. Norman observes that the *Abhidhamma* is later than the rest of the canon. There is no mention in the chronicles of reciting the *Abhidhamma* at the first or second councils, although the *Mahāvamsa* states that the *arahants* who held the second council knew the *Tipiṭaka*. The *Mahāsaṅghikas* who split from the *Theravādins* after the second council are said to have refuted the *Abhidhamma*. This presumably means that there was nothing corresponding exactly to the *Pāli Abhidhamma* in their canon; from which it may be deduced that the *Abhidhamma* did not exist at that time, or at least was not recognized as canonical^[79].

Tradition attributes these books to the Buddha himself. But it is established in *EBC* that, as a matter of fact, they must have been produced during a period of two or three hundred years, beginning from the second or third century after the Buddha's death. The books may be considered in three groups according to their time of compilation: early, middle and late groups^[80]. Now, we put them accordingly into the following chart:

Table 5:

FIRST PERIOD:	1. <i>Dhammasaṅgaṇi</i> 2. <i>Vibhaṅga</i> 3. <i>Puggalapaññatti</i>
SECOND PERIOD:	4. <i>Dhātukathā</i> 5. <i>Kathāvatthu</i>
THIRD PERIOD:	6. <i>Yamaka</i> 7. <i>Paṭṭhāna</i>

It is noticeable that *Buddhaghosa* previously put the seven books in another chronological order and sought to argue for their genuineness as the Buddha's words. According to him they should follow the order: *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Yamaka*, and *Paṭṭhāna*. *EBC* just slightly exchanges the position of *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*. A bigger difference is seen in the *Chinese* translation of the *Samantapāsādikā* where the *Puggalapaññatti* and *Kathāvatthu* come after the *Yamaka* and *Paṭṭhāna*. As to build their genuineness, *Buddhaghosa* states that the textual order of the *Abhidhamma* originated with *Sāriputta*, who also determined the numerical order in the *Paṭṭhāna*. *Sāriputta* is reported to have done this to make it easy to learn, remember, study and teach the *Dhamma*. And, to guard against accusations that this would mean that the *Abhidhamma* was not Buddha-*vacana*, *Buddhaghosa* goes on to say that *Sāriputta* was not the first to

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

understand the *Abhidhamma*, for the Buddha was the first *abhidhammika*^[81].

Buddhaghosa's conviction would encounter the statement by B. C. Law that in dealing with the chronology of the seven treatises, we can only maintain that the order in which these treatises are enumerated can not be interpreted as the order of the chronology. Any attempt at establishing such an interpretation would be vitiated by the fact that the order of enumeration is not in all cases the same. To give example B. C. Law notes that in *Milinda Pañha* the order in which these books are mentioned is: *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (*Dhammasaṅgaha* as *Buddhaghosa* calls it), *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Yamaka*, and *Paṭṭhāna*. So the order recorded in *EBC* of chronology is probably based on the *Milinda Pañha*. B. C. Law hold that an inquiry into the *Suttanta* background of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* becomes a desideratum and we may lay down a general chronology in these terms: The closer the connection with the *Sutta* materials, the earlier is the date of composition. On this basis and in view of some dialectical features B. C. Law observes that *Puggalapaññatti* is the first book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. And his own order for the seven treatises is as follows^[82].

1. *Puggalapaññatti*

2. *Vibhaṅga*

(a) *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* - *Dhātukathā*

(b) *Yamaka*

(c) *Paṭṭhāna*

3. *Kathāvatthu*

The priority of the *Puggalapaññatti* in the B. C. Law's chronology is supported by K. R. Norman who hold that despite its presence in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, the *Puggalapaññatti* owes much, in both form and content, to the *Sutta Piṭaka*. The non-metaphysical nature of the book is emphasized by the fact that in it *puggala* is not used in the sense of "underlying personality", which is found in the *Kathāvatthu* and the *Milinda Pañha*, but simply in the sense of "person, individual". This helps in supporting the view that the *Puggalapaññatti* is the earliest of the *Abhidhamma* texts^[83].

For the laying out of his account of the *Abhidhamma* texts, K. R. Norman follows the order suggested by B. C. Law where the *Paṭṭhāna* is the last book. He, however, prefers the last position of the *Yamaka* to that of *Paṭṭhāna*, saying that such a text, which seems to be intended for someone who has already studied the system, but wishes to become fully competent in it, is perhaps the latest of the books in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*^[84].

Table 6:

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

In B. C. Law's scheme of stratification for the whole *Tipiṭaka*, the *Abhidhamma* texts scatter into the three strata: (1) the *Puggalapaññatti* and the *Vibhaṅga* in the fifth stratum, (2) the *Kathāvatthu* in the sixth stratum, and (3) the *Dhātukathā*, the *Yamaka*, and the *Paṭṭhāna* in the seventh stratum. Unfortunately, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* is not mentioned in B. C. Law's tabulation^[85]. Whereas T. W. Davids is much more vgeneral to put all of them into the tenth and last stratum of his scheme with the note that the last of which is the *Kathāvatthu* and the earliest probably the *Puggalapaññatti*^[86].

On being aware of the position of the *Sutta Piṭaka* as the most substantial importance among the remaining of the Buddhist canonical literature we shall reserve the next whole chapter for an account of its in a chronological prospective.

[6] M. i: 120, 242.

[7] S. i: 75.

[8] J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 169.

[9] see more in the next section.

[10] vijānātī kho bhikkhave tasmā viññāṇaṃ ti vuccati: S. iii: 87.

[11] T. W. Rhys Davids & William Stede, PED: 266.

[12] J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 169.

[13] Ibid. 4: 169.

[14] Dhp. v. 1-2.

[15] see Buddhaghosa, Vism: 21-22, 452-454; and Exp: 84-85.

[16] Saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dhammā cittapa ibaddhā: S. iv: 293.

[17] J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 170.

[18] Dhp. v. 37.

[19] He is said to be the author of Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā. see M. Winternitz, HIL: 344.

[20] J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 171.

[21] Ibid. 4: 169.

[22] D. i: 202.

[23] S. iv: 309.

[24] *Abhabbo kho Sunakkhatta acelo Pātika-putto taṃ vācaṃ appahāya taṃ cittaṃ appahāya taṃ diṭṭhiṃ appaṭinissajjitvā mama sammukhī - bhāvaṃ āgantum. Sace pi'ssa evam assa - Ahaṃ taṃ vācaṃ appahāya taṃ cittaṃ appahāya taṃ diṭṭhiṃ appaṭinissajjitva Samaṇassa Gotamassa sammukhī - bhāvaṃ gaccheyyanti, - mudhā piṭassa vipateyyāti.* For the translation see DB. iii: 18.

[25] J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 170.

[1] NSOED: 1778-1779.

[2] J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 169.

[3] S. v: 263; D. 3: 223; A. iv: 86.

[4] S. i: 194.

[5] Ibid. iv: 195.

The Mind in early Buddhism:...

- [26] J. Atkinson, E. Berne and R. S. Woodworth, *DP*: 187-8.
- [27] J. Dhirasekera, *Op. Cit.* 4: 174.
- [28] Dhs.: 1-5.
- [29] J. Dhirasekera, *Op. Cit.* 4: 170.
- [30] *sududdasa, sunipuna*: Dhp. v. 36.
- [31] *dunniggaḥa, lahu, yatthakāma nipāti* : Dhp. v. 35.
- [32] *Nicca utraṣṭam idaṃ cittaṃ, niccam ubbiggaṃ idaṃ mano*: S. i: 53.
- [33] *Anekāpari-yāyena h'āvuso Sāti paṭiccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo*: M. i: 256-7.
- [34] A. i: 10.
- [35] Dhp. v. 33.
- [36] *Ibid.* v. 34.
- [37] N. Ross Reat, OIP: 99.
- [38] *Ibid.*: 101.
- [39] *Ibid.*: 107.
- [40] *Ibid.*: 254.
- [41] C. A. F. Rhys Davids, BIPDB: 8.
- [42] *Ibid.*: 21.
- [43] *Ibid.*: 68-69.
- [44] N. Ross Reat, OIP: 104.
- [45] *ciketati... sumnena cetasa*: *Ibid.*: 102 sq.
- [46] *Ibid.*: 252.
- [47] *Ibid.*: 103.
- [48] *Ibid.*: 101-102.
- [49] C. A. F. Rhys Davids, BIPDB: 71.
- [50] N. Ross Reat, *op. cit.*: 252.
- [51] David J. Kalupahana, PBP: 12.
- [52] N. Ross Reat, OIP: 253.
- [53] *Ibid.*: 106.
- [54] *Ibid.*: 253-254.
- [55] B. C. Law, HPL: 1.
- [56] *Ibid.*: 13.
- [57] G. P. Malalasekera, DPN, vol. 2: 163.
- [58] B. C. Law, HPL: 13-14.
- [59] K. T. S. Sarao, ONAIB: 33.
- [60] K. L. Hazra, PLL: 132.
- [61] M. Winternitz: HIL: 33.
- [62] K. L. Hazra, PLL: 131.
- [63] *Ibid.*: 131-132.
- [64] *Ibid.*: 135.
- [65] K. R. Norman, PL: 18.
- [66] S. R. Goyal, HIB: 162.
- [67] M. Winternitz, HIL: 25-26.
- [68] *Ibid.*: 33.
- [69] G. C. Pande, SOB: 2.
- [70] K. R. Norman, PL: 28-29.
- [71] G. C. Pande, SOB: 3.
- [72] K. L. Hazra, PLL: 134.
- [73] B. C. Law, HPL: 42.
- [74] G. C. Pande, SOB: 17-18.
- [75] T. W. Rhys Davids, BI: 188.
- [76] see an account of the term in K. R. Norman, PL: 97-98.
- [77] G. C. Pande, SOB: 1-2.
- [78] K. R. Norman, PL: 107.
- [79] *Ibid.*: 96.
- [80] J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 1: 75b sq.
- [81] K. R. Norman, PL: 98.
- [82] B. C. Law, HPL: 21-22.
- [83] K. R. Norman, PL: 102.
- [84] *Ibid.*: 106.
- [85] B. C. Law, HPL: 42.
- [86] T. W. Rhys Davids, BI: 188.